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Jennifer Rubenstein, received her Ph.D. in Political Science from 
the University of Chicago with a dissertation titled "Just 
Samaritans? The politics and ethics of international private aid." 
Her study examined the moral problems faced by private 
voluntary organizations (PVOs) that provide humanitarian aid in 
conflict zones. While such aid has saved hundreds of thousands 
of lives, many observers have noted that it can also cause harm. 
For example, aid has sometimes fueled conflicts indirectly, 
inadvertently facilitated ethnic cleansing, or enabled warring 
parties to avoid their legal responsibilities to victims. Moreover, 
PVOs must often negotiate with warring parties in order to gain 
access to conflict zones. This necessity sometimes forces a choice 
between providing aid to victims and speaking out against human 
rights abuses by warring parties. How, if at all, can these harms 
be justified? Under what conditions is advocacy by humanitarian 
organizations for human rights norms appropriate? What criteria 
should guide PVOs in their effort to distribute resources fairly? 
Rubenstein's research is based on archival research and 
extensive interviews with representatives from four 
organizations: Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, the 
International Rescue Committee, and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.  
Currently a postdoctoral Cotsen Fellow in the Society of Fellows 
at Princeton , Rubenstein will begin a new research project on the 
role of imagination in political life. Her teaching interests include 
modern political theory, democratic theory, women and political 
theory, international ethics and humanitarianism.  
At any one time, large parts of the world are in crisis. Whether 
the crisis is due to natural disaster, government repression, or 
simply underdevelopment, a whole host of humanitarian 
organizations such as Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders, and the 
International Red Cross have the mission of going into these 
areas to alleviate suffering. 
To do this job, humanitarian organizations divide their work into 
two categories: development aid that improves underlying 
conditions, and emergency aid, given in response to a natural or 
manmade disaster. However, Jennifer Rubenstein, a fellow at 
Princeton University, questioned this distinction. While it might 
have logistical advantages, she argued, it does not suit the 
variety of situations and populations requiring aid. 
Rubenstein began by noting differences between development 
and emergency aid. Development aid aims for sustainable 
improvement in living standards, focusing on long-term solutions 
and working closely with governments, while emergency aid 
targets populations affected by unexpected events that produce 
urgent and severe need, focusing on short-term alleviation of 
suffering and rarely allying with governments. 
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While these activities divide neatly into two categories, 
Rubenstein emphasized that situations do not typically divide so 
easily. Most humanitarian organizations make decisions based on 
three principles: prioritizing the worst off, maximizing aggregate 
utility, and fulfilling special obligations. However, these principles 
rarely fall into either the development or emergency category, 
and the two categories can be at cross-purposes. 
While the first principle of prioritizing the worst off would seem to 
elevate emergency aid over development aid, Rubenstein argued, 
that is not necessarily the correct course. While emergency 
situations by definition involve people who suffer urgent and 
severe need for help, in some cases long-term aid would alleviate 
suffering that is just as urgent or severe. For example, the long-
term need for health care could be just as morally demanding the 
need for assistance after a natural disaster. 
Priorities are equally unclear for the second principle of 
maximizing utility, Rubenstein said. For example, should a 
humanitarian organization spend its funds to help flood victims or 
provide clean water? While the flood victims' need might be more 
immediate, both needs are certainly severe. The limited budget 
of many humanitarian organizations is another complication. 
Governments can use tools such as taxation to make it expensive 
to assist certain groups; this means that while aid in some areas 
can be administered cost effectively, these areas are not always 
those most in need. 
Third, Rubenstein discussed the principle of special obligations, 
arguing that it does not fall neatly into development or 
emergency aid either. As intervention in a region continues, 
humanitarian organizations often develop economic partnerships 
with communities, and a sudden pull-out would cause great 
harm. Thus, aid continues not because of new compelling 
reasons, but to avoid a crisis if it were taken away. 
Finally, Rubenstein argued that the frequent prioritization of 
emergency aid over development aid is not always justified. 
Emergencies happen rapidly and seem temporary. While these 
features characterize their urgency, she said, they do not 
demonstrate that the needs are more severe than longer-term 
needs. 
Moreover, Rubenstein argued, the guidelines for defining rapid 
emergence are skewed. For example, the “crude mortality 
statistic” (CMR) is sometimes used to define an emergency, and 
the CMR threshold for declaring an emergency is based on what 
the usual mortality rate is. This means that conditions in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where the usual mortality rate is high, would 
have to worsen beyond their already urgent state before the CMR 
threshold would declare them emergencies. This is clearly not 
just. 
Ultimately, Rubenstein argued that while dividing aid into the 
development and emergency categories might be useful 
logistically, the categories are not good principles for distributing 
resources. She suggested that if humanitarian organizations 
would focus less on the category of aid and more on distributing 
it where it is needed most, that would make their allocation of 
resources more just.  
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